Jacques Ellul and the value of research
- 4 minutes read - 785 wordsLast month, I wrote on both my reading up on Jacques Ellul and on concerns about how we understand the purpose and value of research. I’m continuing to read—or, rather, listen to—Ellul’s The Technological Society, and I was interested to find a passage that brought together these two ideas. Here’s Ellul, writing in the mid-twentieth century:
We have already examined the requirement of immediate applicability; here we meet it again on the state level. The state is not disinterested any more than private capitalists, but it is concerned in a different way. The state claims to represent the public interest and hence to have the duty of being a “good manager,” dispensing the public revenues only on condition that they mean something, that they pay off. Disinterested activity on the part of the state is inconceivable. Some may such that such activity should not be impossible; but in fact it is impossible. Neither individuals nor public opinion nor the structure of the state is oriented toward the acceptance of the kind of culture pure scientific research would represent.
The state demands that anything scientific enter into the line of “normal” development, not only for the stake of the public interest but also because of its will to power. We have previously noted that this will to power has found in technique an extraordinary means of expression. The state quickly comes to demand that technique keep its promises and be an effective servant of state power. Everything not of direct interest to this drive for power appears valueless. Just as financiers seek their interest in money profit, the state seeks it in power. In neither case is the motivation disinterested; technical discovery must pay off. Capitalists and state alike become impatient at delays in research, at experiments which a priori “lead to nothing,” and at the “uncertainty” of the scientist when he indulges in pure research without knowing in advance which research will pay off and which will not. Moreover, the tendency is to eliminate from the legitimate concerns of the state all sciences that have no immediate practical application: history, philosophy, grammar, and so on.
In the case of sciences susceptible of practical application, there is an immediate demand for this application. This is, of course, unfavorable to science; but it must not be imagined that it is the work of imbeciles.
The state begins by assigning a precise task to scientific research, issuing directives to the effect that it must find solutions for certain pressing problems, for example, a more rapid method to produce a part of a machine, a jet engine for aircraft, and so on. These directives are veritable commands to scientific research to summon all its resources to solve the problems as soon as possible. In a democratic system there are no sanctions against scientists who fail to fulfill the state’s demands, except suppression of financial support. A dictatorial regime, however, goes very much further to secure the compliance of the scientists. Even though it still leaves a rather broad area to personal initiative, it nevertheless tends more and more to become specific on this score.
This passage feels obviously relevant—and particularly prescient—in the context of the axes being taken to U.S. academia in this particular moment. However, what I appreciate most about Ellul’s writing here (and in other parts of the book) is the way that it gives voice to nagging concerns that I’ve had for several years about how we think of research in the United States. Even before the chaos of the current Trump administration, there’s been a tendency on the part of the U.S. system and the researchers who work within it to emphasize serving state interests at the expense of other valuable areas of academia. I’ve had to fight with reviewers and editors who want me to demonstrate the practical applications of my research findings rather than assume that there is inherent value in descriptive and exploratory work. We’ve seen the downplaying of “science that have no immediate practical application.” Funding for education research has implicitly emphasized research that in some way boosts the U.S. economy, and it’s hard for researchers with other priorities to find the same kind of support for their research.
This isn’t meant as any kind of nihilism or both-sides-ism—the past few months have clearly seen a turn for the worse. And yet, Ellul gives us a way of understanding how the “good old days” of 6 months ago were not without considerable problems either. As we bemoan the research ecosystem currently unfolding in the United States, let us have the imagination and the courage to not just long for the status quo ante but to strive for an even better system.
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